es2212w10

Week 10: Vygotsky (2)

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Last updated 23.11.11.

Introduction

Vygotsky’s ‘social constructivism’ asserts that others create for us a social setting where learning takes place as a ‘dialectical’ (collaborative) process. He rejected the ‘concealed evolutionism’ (Vygotsky, 1991) which he believed to be integral to the analogy of human cognition with plant growth (that is apparent in Piaget’s work) and challenged assumptions of a linear model of development. Instead, he proposed a more complex relationship between evolution, involution and revolution, in order to reflect the complexity of cognitive development. In particular, he wanted to find a way of acknowledging that human development does not unfold neatly, consistently, or predictably - but is characterised by ‘leaps’ that are stimulated by social interaction.

Vygotsky did not perceive or represent the human mind as expressing an inherent logical system. As Bruner observes, Vygotsky believes that:

… higher order systems [of thought] are cultural products. As instruments of mind, they do not mature exclusively through endogenous principles of growth (Bruner, 1997: 68).

Instead, he offered an interpretation of the human mind as having the capacity to endow meaning as a result of interaction or dialogue.

The history of development of signs brings us to a much more general law governing the development of behaviour. The essence of this law is that in the process of development the child begins to practice with respect to himself the same forms of behaviour that others formerly practised with respect to him. The child learns the social forms of behaviour and applies them to himself (Vygotsky, 1991:36).

But how does the social become individual, and to what extent can individual understanding transfer from one social setting to another? (Daniels, 2001). Vygotsky argues that as social interaction is principally constituted and mediated by speech: what gets internalised into the child’s stream of thought are the meanings and forms generated in verbal exchange, which themselves are products of a broader cultural-historical system. However, the internalisation is not a mere ‘mimicking’ of what has been shared:

Thus equipped, mind not only expresses the culture but, by virtue of the generative powers of these systems, like language, it is able to be ‘free’ or to go beyond being a mere slave of the prevailing cultural order (Bruner, 1997: 68).

Zone of Proximal Development

This is one of the most well-known aspects of Vygotsky’s work, and refers to the area of development and learning where the child’s empirically rich, but disorganised spontaneous concepts ‘meet’, and are extended by, the systematicity and logic of adult reasoning.

The discrepancy between a child’s actual mental age and the level he reaches in solving problems with assistance indicates the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky, 1986: 187).

Vygotsky uses the term ‘Actual Developmental Level’ to describe the level of development established for a child’s mental functions as a result of certain completed developmental cycles. It reflects the end-products of development: functions that have already matured, and so assumes that it is only things that children can do which are indicative of their mental abilities.

The Zone of Proximal Development refers to the child’s potential development: what Vygotsky describes as the gap between what one can do on one’s own, unassisted, and what one can do with assistance from a knowledgeable other

It is the distance between the actual developmental level as determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through problem solving under adult guidance or in collaboration with more capable peers.’ [It] defines those functions that have not yet matured but are in the process of maturation, functions that will mature tomorrow, but are currently in an embryonic state. These functions could be termed the “buds” or “flowers” of development rather than the “fruits” of development. (Vygotsky, 1978: 86).

The Peculiar Case of Play and the ZPD

Vygostky argues that in play, the child uses their imagination and so the objects they use for their play lose their ‘determining force’.

The child sees one thing but acts differently in relation to what he sees. Thus, a condition is reached in which the child begins to act independently of what he sees (Vygotsky, 1978: 96-7).

This represents the ‘transitional’ nature of play, where the child begins to move from the ‘situational constraints’ of early childhood towards the ‘context-free’ and abstract thinking of adulthood. So for Vygotsky, play is not merely an enjoyable pastime, but a mechanism for development.

The creation of an imaginary situation is not a fortuitous fact in a child’s life, but is rather the first manifestation of the child’s emancipation from situational constraints (Vygotsky, 1978: 99).

Moreover, play allows the child to enter the ZPD without the assistance of an adult

… play creates a zone of proximal development of the child. In play a child always behaves beyond his average age, above his daily behaviour; in play it is as though her were a head taller than himself. As in the focus of a magnifying glass, play contains all developmental tendencies in a condensed form and is itself a major source of development (Vygotsky, 1978: 102).

Implications for Pedagogy

The social constructivist interpretation of human cognitive development (and Vygotsky’s particular arguments about the ZPD) means that the intervention of the carer or teacher (or possibly a peer) is crucial to a child’s learning.

Unlike Piaget, Vygotsky did not believe that it was necessary for a child to be ‘ready’ before he was able to learn something new. He argued that adults could and should provide a child with activities above his developmental level, far enough to provide challenge, but not so far it would demoralise or confuse. In other words, in helping children to learn, adults should provide experiences that fall within the ZPD, so that they might achieve something they would not do so alone (Birch, 1997: 82).

This intervention has come to be known as ‘scaffolding’ due to Bruner’s work that popularises Vygotsky’s ideas and offers strategies for translating them into practice. Bruner asserts that the ‘tutor’ aids a learner’s cognitive development by:

… shielding a learner from distraction, by forefronting crucial features of a problem, by sequencing the steps to understanding, by promoting negotiation, or by some other form of ‘scaffolding’ the task at hand (Bruner, 1997: 69).

It is usual to align this interpretation of ‘good’ teaching with Vygotsky’s work exclusively – but is it really so alien to Piaget’s ideas for his work to be neglected (and sometimes dismissed) in contemporary pedagogical debates?

References

Biddell, T. (1992) ‘Beyond interactionism in contextualist models of development’ Human Development 35 pp. 306-15

Birch, A. (1997) Developmental Psychology: from infancy to adulthood Basingstoke: Macmillan (2^nd edition)

Bruner, J. (1997) Celebrating divergence: Piaget and Vygotsky Human Development 40 (2) pp. 63-73

Daniels, H. (2001 )Vygotsky and Pedagogy London: Routledge/Falmer

Vygotsky, L. S. (1978) Mind in Society Cambridge MA: Cambridge University Press

Vygotsky, L. S. (1991) ‘Genesis of the higher mental functions’ in: Light, P., Sheldon, S. and Woodhead, M. (eds) (1991) Learning to Think London: Routledge/Open University

Vygotsky, L.S. (1997) Educational Psychology Boca Raton, FL: St Lucie Press (originally written 1921-3)

Visit this website for 'The Problem of the Cultural Development of the Child' by Lev Vygotsky http://www.marxists.org/archive/vygotsky/works/1929/cultural_development.htm