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Warnock’s case for special schooling
No serious account of the development of special education in the UK should exclude due consideration of the influence that Mary Warnock has had on the field, an influence that was established in 1978 with the publication of the Inquiry into the education of handicapped children, which has come to be known as the Warnock Report. This Report informed the Education Act of 1981, which introduced statements for children who were deemed to have ‘special educational needs’ (SEN).
Once a child received one of these statements they were entitled to receive access to special support and education. However, Warnock has come to question the recommendations of the Report, identifying within it the distorting influence of an ‘inclusive ideology’ that was, she claims ‘taking a foothold in society generally’ during the time it was produced (1974-8) (Warnock, 2010, p. 13). As a consequence of this ‘ideology’, inclusion in education was, Warnock suggests, connected to the integration of children with statements of SENs into ‘mainstream’ schools. In other words, questions concerning the education of young people with impairments came to be viewed through the lens of an ideal that was not itself grounded in the reality of educational needs, experiences and practices.
Warnock (2010, 13) grounds her argument in the ‘genuine differences’ that separate young people, differences that must be attended to if these diverse needs are to be recognised and meet.
It is Warnock’s view that the difficulties experienced by children categorised as having SEN could be addressed through the creation of ‘a new kind of specialist school’, one ‘that can cater properly not only for children with specific disabilities which render them unable to function in large schools, but also for children with needs that arise from social disadvantage’ (Warnock, 2010, p. 44). Rather than being a means for securing support in mainstream schools, Warnock proposes that statements of SEN should be reconceived as ‘passports’, a way of gaining access to these small, specialist schools (Warnock, 2010, p. 33). Warnock contends that because these schools would include children into relationships where each child’s needs would be attended to and met, access to them would be judged ‘a privilege’ (2010, p. 40).
What emerges in Warnock’s discussion of special education is a clear-cut distinction between the realities of educational inclusion and exclusion on the one hand, and imposed inclusive ‘ideology’ on the other hand. Thus, Warnock (2010, p. 37) draws upon real-world experiences - including the psychiatrist, Lorna Wing, who spoke to her of the ‘able autistic adults who carry the misery of their mainstream school days with them into adult life, sometimes with disastrous consequences’, the “children who, as they get older, come to realize painfully that they are ‘different’,” and the large secondary school in which survival requires an ‘inevitable toughness’ that for these children ‘is an impossible goal’ - and juxtaposes these examples with an account of a ‘political ideology’ that demands all young people are educated in the same type of educational institution.
Isaiah Berlin, positive and negative freedom, and the future of special schools
Two concepts of freedom: negative and positive
My thesis is that historically the notion of ‘positive’ liberty — in answer to the question ‘Who is master?’ — diverged from that of ‘negative’ liberty, designed to answer ‘Over what area am I master? (Berlin, 1969a: xliv)
In other words, where positive freedom asks, Am I in control of my choices. Negative freedom asks, How many choices do I have?
Berlin insists: ‘whatever may be the common ground between them … negative and positive liberty are not the same thing. Both are ends in themselves. These ends may clash irreconcilably’ (Berlin, 1969a: xlix)
Negative freedom
The criterion of oppression is the part that I believe to be played by other human beings, directly or indirectly, with or without the intention of doing so, in frustrating my wishes. By being free in this sense I mean not being interfered with by others. The wider the area of non-interference the wider my freedom. (Berlin, 1969b: 123)
‘liberty in this sense means liberty from’ (original emphasis, Berlin, 1969b: 127)
Negative freedom and the individualist view of human nature
To threaten a man with persecution unless he submits to a life in which he exercises no choices of his goals … is to sin against the truth that he is a man, a being with a life of his own to live. (Berlin, 1969b: 127)
‘Every plea for civil liberties and individual rights … springs from this individualistic, and much disputed concept of man’ (Berlin, 1969b: 128).
(We will explore in depth this view of human nature and human freedom when we discuss the ideas of John Stuart Mill.)
Positive freedom and the difference between authentic and inauthentic selves
The ‘positive’ sense of the word ‘liberty’ derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not of other men’s, acts of will. (Berlin, 1969b: 131)
On the face of it, this concept of freedom may appear to be ‘at no great logical distance [from the negative concept] – no more than negative and positive ways of saying much the same thing’ (Berlin, 1969b: 132). However, these two concepts have ‘historically developed in divergent directions’ and, most significantly, both arise from quite distinct understandings of human nature (Berlin, 1969b: 132).
Berlin writes: ‘conceptions of freedom directly derive from views of what constitutes a self, a person, a man’ (Berlin, 1969b: 134).
While the negative concept of freedom derives from an individualistic view of human beings, positive freedom rests on a view of man as compassing two selves, one authentic and the other inauthentic. Berlin characterises the distinction between these two selves thus:
The higher self: “my ‘real’, or ‘ideal’, or ‘autonomous’ self, or with my self ‘at its best’ …” (Berlin, 1969b: 132).
The lower self: “my ‘lower’ nature, the pursuit of immediate pleasures … swept away by every gust of desire and passion …’ (Berlin, 1969b: 132).
The higher self may be viewed as the social self:
Presently the two selves may be represented as divided by an even larger gap: the real self may be conceived as something wider than the individual … as a social ‘whole’ of which the individual is an element or aspect … This entity is then identified as being the ‘true’ self which, by imposing its collective, or ‘organic’, single will upon its recalcitrant ‘members’, achieves its own, and therefore their, ‘higher’ freedom. (Berlin, 1969b: 132)
Here, Berlin is outlines the position that our true or authentic selves and our true or authentic freedom are realised only once we are part of a community, a universal, or a whole. Given this position, an individual alone is unable to realise their essential social or political nature: they are no longer ‘truly’ human, and, therefore, no longer ‘truly’ free.
(We will explore in depth this view of human nature and human freedom when we discuss the ideas of Karl Marx.)
The scope of negative freedom and special schools:
The extent of my freedom seems to depend on (a) how many possibilities are open to me …; (b) how easy or difficult each of these possibilities is to actualize; (c) how important in my plan of life … these possibilities are …; (d) how far they are closed and opened by deliberate human acts; (e) what value not only the agent, but the general sentiment of the society in which he lives, puts on the various possibilities. (Berlin, 1969b: 130, n)
What, then, of the young person who has a choice between attending a special school or their local, comprehensive schools?
(a) Two choices are open to the young person (her parents unable to afford private school fees)
(b) Neither choice would be difficult to realise – there are no issues with travel, costs, etc.
(c) It is important to the young person and her parents that she be able to attend a special school, alongside her friends, a place where she will feel safe
(d) These possibilities will be denied down by a government policy to close down special schools
(e) For both the young person and her parents and (arguably) for society in general choice in education is of importance.
Berlin against positive freedom
Berlin concedes that ‘on occasion’ I might be coerced into doing I dislike if this is ‘for my benefit’, and even, that doing so ‘may enlarge the scope of my liberty’ (Berlin, 1969b: 134). But there is, for Berlin, a crucial distinction to be made between admitting that sometimes one can be coerced into doing something for my one’s own good and asserting:
[I]f it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, whether I know this or not, and am free (or ‘truly’ free) even while my poor earthly body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against those who seek however benevolently to impose it, with the greatest desperation. (Berlin, 1969b: 134)
In other words, if I am drunk and attempt to drive a car, then the following morning I may thank you for stopping me from making a terrible mistake. You may respond by saying: ‘Yes, I had to deny you your freedom in order that you didn’t harm yourself or others’. But this is quite different, for Berlin, from saying: ‘Yes, I did not deny your freedom because I did what you really wanted, what you would have done if only you had been of your true or higher self’.
Berlin’s view applied to the closing of special schools
Berlin presents any government who decides to close down special schools with a dilemma.
Either:
The government admits that they are limiting the freedom of parents and the young, that they are decreasing their sphere of non-interference.
Or:
The government can deny the significance of negative freedom. They can argue that parents and children are gaining and not losing freedom, because in a ‘mainstream’ school they will obtain opportunities to live a ‘truly’ human life that are denied to them in special schools.
If the government takes the latter line, then they have, according to Berlin, committed a ‘monstrous impersonation’ (Berlin, 1969b: 132) – they are arguing that the young person and their parents actually want to go to the ‘mainstream’ school, even though they may protest indignantly against the closure of their special school.
The notion of what it is to be included in education is imposed upon the child and her family - even if they believe firmly that the special school is inclusive. The ‘universalist’ knows best, having grasped a higher metaphysical insight, having witnessed the truth of inclusive education.
The universalist sees special schools as inherently demeaning, meaning that even if a child does not actually feel demeaned in a special school, she has reason to do so. This point is emphasised using terms like ‘exclusion’ and ‘segregation’ to refer to special school practice. Children at special schools are excluded, are segregated, even if they have elected to attend these schools and are confident and learning well. (Cigman, 2007: 786)
Such a government, Berlin contends, is “in a position to ignore the actual wishes of men or societies, to bully, oppress, torture them in the name, and on behalf, of their ‘real’ selves …” (Berlin, 1969b: 133).
Berlin claims that any government, group or person in this position adopts the following attitude:
Since I know the only true path to the ultimate solution of the problems of society, I know which way to drive the human caravan; and since you are ignorant of what I know, you cannot be allowed to have liberty of choice even within the narrowest limits, if the goal is to be reached. (Berlin, 1991a: 15)
‘This view has a theoretical or metaphysical underpinning, which is to say that it will be found compelling or not depending on whether one is prepared to accept a highly abstract argument’ (Cigman, 2007: 787)
Berlin’s pluralism
Berlin makes a distinction between a metaphysical view of politics and human freedom and an empirical view.
He connects the metaphysical view with a positive concept of freedom and the empirical view with a negative concept of freedom.
Of the metaphysical view, he writes:
One belief, more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of individuals on the alters of the great historical ideals … This is the belief that … there is a final solution. (Berlin, 1969b: 167)
This is a belief in the compatibility of human goods and ideals, in ‘the notion of a final harmony in which all riddles are solved, all contradictions reconciled …’ (Berlin, 1969b: 168). For Berlin, this is the belief of ‘every rationalist metaphysician from Plato to the disciples of Hegel or Marx’ (Berlin, 1969b: 168). It is the belief that there is a true society and self, and that true or positive freedom consists in realising this ‘final harmony’.
Berlin does not assert that pluralism will entail peace and the end of oppression – certainly there will be endless, impassioned debate, even antagonism in a pluralist society - but he does advance the empirical claim is that ‘monism is at the root of every extremism’ (Berlin, 1998: 57).
Against the ‘philosophical monists who demand final solutions’ (Berlin, 1969a: l), Berlin advances an empirical view. When we ‘fall back on the ordinary resources of empirical observation and ordinary human knowledge … these certainly give us no warrant for supposing … that all good things, or all bad things for that matter, are reconcilable with each other’ (Berlin, 1969b: 168).
Instead, we ‘encounter in ordinary experience … choices between ends equally ultimate, and claims equally absolute … Indeed, it is because this is their situation that men place such immense value upon the freedom to choose …’ (Berlin, 1969b: 168).
The appeal to metaphysics to support an ethical argument is misguided and also damaging. There is a logical difference between metaphysics and ethics, which I should like to express as follows. Metaphysics tolerates and sustains either-or thinking, whereas ethics is often corrupted by such thinking. (Cigman, 2007: 789)
What is needed, Berlin, claims, is a society where liberty is counted among the rich multitude of human ends; he writes:
The extent of a man’s, or a people’s, liberty to choose to live as they desire must be weighed up against the claims of many other values, of which equality, or justice, or happiness, or security, or public order are perhaps the most obvious examples. (Berlin, 1969b: 170)
For Berlin, one of the chief logical errors in the positive concept of freedom dwells in the belief that freedom can be equated to justice, happiness, etc. In an open, liberal society the value of (negative) freedom can be measured against other values on empirical and not metaphysical grounds. Hence Berlin’s belief in a pluralistic society:
Pluralism, with the measure of ‘negative’ liberty that it entails, seems to me a truer and more humane ideal than the goals of those who seek in the great, disciplined, authoritarian structures the ideal of ‘positive’ self-mastery by classes, or peoples, or the whole of mankind. It is truer, because it does, at least, recognize the fact that human goals are many, not all of them commensurable, and in perpetual rivalry with one another. (Berlin, 1969b: 171)
Berlin’s claim here is that value pluralism arises out of the actual condition of human life, and that from these existing conditions we can derive conceptual insights into what it means to be alive upon the earth. Hence, Berlin writes:
… the human condition is such that men cannot always avoid choices … there are many possible courses of action and forms of life worth living, and therefore to choose between them is part of being rational or capable of moral judgment; they cannot avoid choice for one central reason (which is, in the ordinary sense, conceptual, not empirical), namely that ends collide; that one cannot have everything. (Berlin, 1969a: li)
And: ‘Some among the great Goods cannot live together. That is a conceptual truth. We are doomed to choose, and choice may entail an irreparable loss’ (Berlin, 1991a: 13).
Pluralism involves awakening to many ways of being; its first principle is the refusal to impose a way of being upon others: ‘Priorities, never final and absolute, must be established’ (Berlin, 1991a: 17). There is no final path, no singular way to human contentment and salvation, there is only ‘an open future without a guarantee of a happy ending’ (Berlin, 1991b: 236).
Berlin’s pluralism and special schools
Berlin’s argument suggests to us that closing down special needs schools is not a question of increasing or decreasing freedom but rather of weighing freedom against other goods. If parents wish to send their children to special schools we deny them their freedom by closing down these schools – we might justify this on the grounds of fairness, equality or justice, but not liberty. Berlin writes:
… it is, I believe, desirable to introduce a uniform system of general primary and secondary education in every country, if only in order to do away with distinctions of social status that are at present created or promoted by the existence of a social hierarchy of schools in some Western countries, notably my own… If I were told that this must severely curtail the liberty of parents who claim the right not to be interfered with in this matter — that it was an elementary right to be allowed to choose the type of education to be given to one’s child, to determine the intellectual, religious, social, economic conditions in which the child is to be brought up — I should not be ready to dismiss this outright. (Berlin, 1969a: liv)
The demand for uniform schooling creates a ‘clash’ of values that is, for Berlin, between the freedom of parents over the education their children should receive and the creation of a fairer society, and finally, the creation of the conditions of freedom. For Berlin the central point is that uniform or inclusive schooling would ‘severely curtail the liberty of parents’.
Overall, Berlin’s argument against positive freedom indicates to us that the future of special schools should be decided upon empirical grounds and not upon a metaphysical view of human nature and freedom. Thus Barrow might have been influenced by Berlin when he argued against the ideal of full inclusion in education and pronounced: ‘We should take each individual issue on its own and seek to resolve it on educational grounds’ (Barrow, 2001:241). In other words, the ideal of inclusive education should not out-weigh significant empirical issues, including the needs and wishes of students and their parents.
‘Rather, the possibility of including everyone is asserted or assumed, and in this sense it is essentially an article of faith’ (Cigman, 2007: 785).
‘I am concerned that special educators have become so bewitched by their theories and so intent on their theory-building that they forget … that some children are losing out on an education’ (Cigman, 2007: 790).
Summary of Berlin’s argument
Negative freedom |
Positive freedom |
Freedom from interference by others
|
Freedom secured when acting, speaking and being ‘truly’ human |
Empirical |
Metaphysical |
Pluralism |
Monism |
References
Arendt, H. (1971) The life of the mind (London, Harcourt).
Berlin, I. (1969a) Introduction, in: Four essays on liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Berlin, I. (1969b) Two concepts of liberty, in: Four essays on liberty (Oxford, Oxford University Press)
Berlin, I (1991a) The pursuit of the Ideal, in The crooked timber of humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas(London, Fontana Press)
Berlin, I (1991b) The apotheosis of the Romantic Will, in The crooked timber of humanity: Chapters in the History of Ideas(London, Fontana Press)
Berlin, I. (1998) The first and the last (London, Granta)
Barrow, R. (2001) Inclusion vs. Fairness, Journal of Moral Education, 30(3), 235-242.